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Abstract 
 
  Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes 
an investment.  Such government rent-seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem.  Government ownership 
serves as a second-best commitment mechanism, through which the government agency will restrain itself from the 
rent-seeking activity and may even offer the manager assistance in the form of tax breaks and subsidies.  This 
mechanism works at a cost, however, as government ownership also compromises ex post managerial incentives and 
creates distortion in resource allocation.  Nevertheless, government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership 
under certain conditions.  These conditions correspond to a host of stylized empirical observations concerning local 
government-owned firms, i.e., township-village enterprises, during China’s transition to a market economy.   
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1. Introduction 
 
For the past two decades, China has experienced remarkable economic growth, despite the absence of an 
adequate system of checks and balances that hold governments, especially local governments, accountable.  Local 
governments, using their leverage over public resources and regulatory authorities, have been able to levy seemingly 
arbitrary fees and charges on, and even extort bribes from, local business.
2  In such an environment, private 
enterprise played only a minor role in China’s economic growth during most of the last two decades.  By 1993, the 
private sector accounted for only about 15 percent of China’s industrial output.  In the same environment, however, 
non-state firms, i.e., firms not owned by the state government, spearheaded China’s economic growth.  The share of 
these firms in national industrial output increased from 22 percent to 42 percent between 1978 and 1993 (State 
Statistical Bureau, 1994).  One striking example of these non-state firms is local government-controlled enterprises 
in rural areas, known as township-village enterprises (TVEs).  The share of these enterprises in national industrial 
output increased from 9 percent in 1978 to 27 percent in 1993.  More importantly, despite at times being predatory 
(Byrd and Gelb, 1990 and Whiting, 1995), local governments have been instrumental in the success of these 
enterprises.  Studies have shown that local governments have been responsible for providing critical inputs, such as 
land, securing loans, and offering political support to these non-state firms.
3  To put it differently, the grabbing hand 
of these local governments has been turned into a helping hand under local government-ownership.   
Motivated by these observations, this paper explores ownership of firms in an environment in which 
governments are not held accountable.  We show that, in such an environment, government ownership may serve as 
a second-best commitment mechanism to restrain local governments from rent-seeking activities.  Under 
government ownership, a government agency subordinates its interest to the performance of the firms under its 
control and, hence, to the incentives of private agents managing these firms.  To encourage efforts from these private 
agents and ultimately to advance its own interest, the government agency may become less inclined to extract rents 
from these agents and may even offer assistance in the form of tax breaks or subsidies.  In contrast, when firms are 
privately owned, the government agency will extract as much rents as possible from private agents because it does 
not have an ongoing stake in these firms.  As a result, government-owned firms may suffer less from government 
rent-seeking activities than private firms and, therefore, they will have more room for development.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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Che and Qian (1998b) introduce a similar idea regarding government ownership helping to reduce 
government rent-seeking activities.  In particular, these authors show that local government ownership can limit the 
predatory behavior of the state.  This study expands the idea of that paper and demonstrates that local government 
ownership can actually limit rent-seeking activities by the local government itself.   
During the early stage of China’s economic transition, local governments controlled the allocation of 
various inputs, such as land, electricity, water, licensing, and financial capital.  Such government control is the 
institutional basis for government rent-seeking.  In their studies of China’s local government ownership, Li (1996), 
Hsiao et al (1998), Chen and Rozelle (1999), and Tian (2000) also emphasize the privilege enjoyed by local 
governments over private parties, such as entrepreneurs and managers, in resource allocation.  However, these 
analyses assume non-corrupt local governments that are useful in production.  Consequently, they focus on how to 
make the best use of the local governments’ efforts.  In contrast, this paper recognizes explicitly that the local 
governments are not accountable, and therefore may be corrupt, and that the local governments are perhaps as 
counter-productive as they may be technologically useful in production.  To separate this analysis from these 
existing studies, we therefore consider a setting where not only is there no need to offer a local government 
incentives in production, in fact the role of the local government is counter-productive in production.   We show 
that, even under this condition, ownership may be allocated optimally to the local government.  In particular, by 
acknowledging the possibility that the government-controlled inputs can be acquired in the market through bribery, 
this paper addresses Coase’s classic question in the context of government regulated resources.  Should the 
transaction of such resources take place in the market or within the boundary of the firm, i.e., by granting the local 
government ownership of the firm?   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Sections 2 introduces the model in which a manager 
undertakes and manages an investment that requires an input controlled by a government agency.  Then the 
benchmark of private ownership, illustrating that government rent-seeking may completely eliminate the manager’s 
incentives to undertake an investment, is presented.  Section 3 analyzes government ownership and shows that the 
manager will be enticed to undertake the investment because the government agency may restrain itself from rent-
seeking under government ownership.  In section 4, the analysis is extended to derive several comparative static 
results.  Section 5 concludes by linking this analysis to several stylized empirical observations concerning TVEs.  
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2. The Model and the Benchmark 
 
There are two risk neutral players, a manager and a government agency.  The manager possesses technical 
expertise necessary for an investment project and is responsible for initiating and managing the project.  To initiate 
an investment, the manager must expend effort, denoted by e, e ∈ ℜ
+.  By taking effort e, the manager incurs a 
private cost, also denoted by e.  Once effort is undertaken, the investment occurs with probability µ(e) where µ(.) is 
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave and it satisfies the Inada condition.   
The investment requires an input after it is initiated.  The input can be land, electricity, financial capital, a 
license, or a quota.  For a more general reference, we adopt the term used by Banerjee (1997) and refer to this input 
as a slot.  The government agency is any local regulatory authority, such as a local government, charged by a higher-
level government, which is not modeled in this paper, with the responsibility of allocating the slot.   
Due to the lack of an adequate system of checks and balances, the government agency cannot be held 
accountable.  While the slot should be allocated to the investment at the regulated price that is normalized to zero, 
the government agency may use its authority to collect illicitly a fee for the slot.
4  In particular, once the investment 
is initiated, the government agency will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the manager to pay a fee, B, or the slot 
will not be allocated to the investment.  
The illicitly charged fee is not verifiable in court.  Instead, the fee-slot transaction is enforced either in the 
form of a spot transaction or through some informal enforcement mechanism such as reputation.  Thus, the 
government agency allocates the slot once the manager pays the fee.  If the slot is not allocated, the investment will 
be terminated and generate a low return that is assumed to be zero, although this assumption is relaxed later in 
section 4.  If the slot is allocated, the investment continues and, when completed, it yields a positive return of which 
the expected value is R.
5  The actual return is not contractible.   
The expected return is determined by two factors.  The first factor is managerial effort expended to 
implement the investment, denoted by a, a ∈ ℜ
+.  The manager incurs a private cost, also denoted by a, for this 
effort.  The second factor is an unverifiable control decision x, x ∈ [0, x*], which affects not only the total amount 
of the investment return, but also the marginal productivity of managerial effort a.  In this model, we interpret x to 
be the number of excess workers hired.  Like their counterparts in other countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), one 
of the primary objectives of local Chinese governments is to create employment opportunities for their constituents William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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(Song and Du, 1990; Rozelle and Boisvert, 1994; Putterman, 1997; and Jin and Qian, 1998).  Although we interpret 
x as a decision to hire excess workers, it may be thought of more generally as any control decision that allows the 
government agency to interfere with the normal operation of the government-owned investment.  For example, x 
could be an activity that diverts funds from the investment to finance local public expenditure.  
The government agency does not have any productive role, from a technological perspective, in the 
investment.  This is not to say that, in reality, Chinese local governments do not play any positive roles in the 
development of non-state enterprises; often they do.  However, we choose to model the government agency’s 
control decision as something unproductive in order to highlight that, even in this extreme circumstance, 
government ownership may still dominate private ownership.
6  We assume that R = f(a, x) where f(., .) is twice 
differentiable and concave in {a, x}.  In addition, f(., .) is strictly increasing in a, strictly decreasing in x, and 
satisfies the Inada condition in {a, x}.  The hiring of excess workers reduces investment return, so that ∂f/∂x < 0; 
and it reduces the marginal productivity of the managerial effort as well, so that ∂
2f/(∂a∂x) < 0.
7 
The control decision depends on the ownership form of the investment.  We consider two ownership forms, 
namely, private ownership and government ownership.  Under private ownership, the manager controls the hiring 
decision; under government ownership, the decision right is allocated to the government agency.  The owner 
receives private benefits from making the control decision.  In the context of hiring excess workers, these private 
benefits may be political benefits pertinent to the government agency only.  Thus, without loss of generality, we 
assume that the manager derives no private benefits from over-staffing, but that the political benefits increase as the 
number of excess workers increases for the government agency.  For simplicity, we assume that the political benefits 
of over-staffing have no social value. 
  The tendency for the government agency to pursue a political agenda of encouraging employment depends 
on factors such as the political climate that the government agency faces and the local economic condition that 
prevails at the time (Byrd and Gelb, 1990).  These factors determine both the pressures and the rewards for the 
government agency to expand local employment.  Instead of modeling these factors explicitly, we introduce a 
simple parameter θ to represent states of nature that determine the propensity for the government agency to pursue 
its political agenda.  Let U(x, θ) represent the political benefits for the government agency.  U(x, θ) is differentiable, 
strictly increasing and concave in x, and satisfies the Inada condition with respect to x.  θ ∈ {θh, θl} such that ∂U(x, 
θh)/∂x < ∂U(x, θl)/∂x.  In other words, the government agency finds the marginal political benefits of hiring William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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additional workers much higher in state θl than in state θh.  Correspondingly, the government agency in state θl 
could be considered to be pro-politics and the government agency in state θh could be considered to be a pro-
business government agency. 
Naturally, the government agency has better information about the presence of factors that determine its 
propensity to pursue its own political agenda than does the manager.  Thus, without loss of generality, we assume 
that the actual state of nature is revealed at the time when the investment is initiated only to the government agency.  
Ex ante, the manager has only an a priori knowledge that θ = θh with probability p and θ = θl with probability 1 – p.  
Nevertheless, the manager may form his posterior belief about the government agency’s type based upon the 
behavior of this government agency.
8  The manager may have either reasonably good knowledge about the 
government agency’s type or have very little knowledge about this.  In the first case, p will be close to either 1 or 0; 
in the second case, p will be around ½.  One common perception is that, given the physical proximity between the 
local government and the local economy, especially in the context of China’s TVEs, information asymmetry 
between the government agency and the manager may not be very significant in reality.  Such a phenomenon can be 
captured by a p that is close to either 1 or 0.  Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the manager, or other private 
agents, may never know for sure the true type of the government agency, even for the case of China’s TVEs.  As it 
will be shown, provided that p ∈ (0, 1), the results of this analysis are strengthened when the information asymmetry 
becomes insignificant, especially when p is sufficiently close to 1.  
In addition to allowing the owner to take the decision x and receive the political benefits from it, if any, the 
ownership form also determines the distribution of the return on investment.  Under private ownership, the return 
accrues only to the manager.  We assume that the return on investment is divided between the government agency 
and the manager under government ownership.  To avoid the unnecessary details of how these shares are determined 
endogenously, we assume that the government agency receives an exogenously fixed share λG of the investment 
return and the manager receives a share of (1 - λG) of the investment return.
9 
 The government agency’s objective is to maximize both its political benefits and the rents extracted from 
the investment project, either through the fee it collects or through the return on investment that it shares under 
government ownership.  The manager’s objective is to maximize the amount of rents he will receive from the 
investment, net of the costs of his efforts.  The following figure summarizes the sequence of events under private 
ownership and under government ownership. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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The appropriate solution concept is a sequential equilibrium.  However, this approach often leads to 
multiple equilibria, some of which may be unreasonable.  To eliminate unreasonable equilibria, we will apply the 
intuitive-criterion test (Cho and Kreps, 1987) whenever necessary.  In the context of this model, the intuitive-
criterion test checks whether the manager has an unreasonable posterior belief after the government agency deviates 
from its equilibrium behavior.  Loosely speaking, suppose a government agency of a particular type, either pro-
business or pro-politics, will never choose action A under any posterior belief of the manager, and yet a government 
agency of the other type might choose action A under some posterior belief of the manager.  According to the 
intuitive-criterion test, a posterior belief ρ(A) that assigns a positive probability to a government agency of the first 
type given that A is observed is considered to be unreasonable.  For the rest of this paper, an equilibrium refers to a 
sequential equilibrium that satisfies this intuitive-criterion test.   
When the government agency can be held accountable, i.e., prevented from collecting arbitrary fees, private 
ownership is the efficient arrangement.   Under private ownership, the manager’s efforts, both ex post implementing 
the investment and ex ante initiating the investment, achieve the social optimum; no excess workers are hired. 
However, private ownership may be less efficient than government ownership when the government agency is not 
held accountable.  Below we develop a benchmark result regarding private ownership under government rent-
seeking before comparing it with government ownership in the next section.  The analysis proceeds by backward 
induction.   
After the fee is paid and the slot is allocated, the manager will not hire excess workers because he derives 
no political benefit from this action.  He supplies an effort level a to maximize [f(a, 0) – a] because he has full claim 
to the investment return.  Let a
p denote the manager’s optimal ex post effort under private ownership.  The 
manager’s payoff at this stage will be [f(a
p, 0) – a
p].  Since it possesses all of the bargaining power when charging a 
The manager chooses an effort 
level, e, to initiate an 
investment while θ is revealed 
to the government agency 
The government 
agency charges a 
fee B ≥ 0  
The manager chooses whether to 
pay the fee and the slot is allocated 
if and only if the fee is paid 
The manager chooses an effort 
level, a, and the owner takes the 
control decision, x 
The investment 
return is generated 
Figure 1. Sequence of EventsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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fee for the slot, the government agency will exploit fully its position and set a fee B
p = [f(a
p, 0) – a
p].  As a result, 
once the investment is initiated, the manager will receive zero payoff from the investment.   Anticipating zero payoff 
from his investment, the manager will not take any effort to initiate the investment.  The next proposition 
summarizes this result. 
 
Proposition 1: 
  Under private ownership, there exists a unique equilibrium in which no investment is ever initiated.   
 
  Unless omitted, all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.  Proposition 1 highlights a typical hold-up 
problem faced by the manager.  Once the effort to initiate the investment is undertaken and the investment project 
begins, the government agency will use its control of the slot to extract the entire surplus from the manager.  
Anticipating this, the manager will never put forth any effort to initiate the investment.  Both the government agency 
and the manager receive a zero payoff because no investment is ever initiated.     
 
3. From the Grabbing Hand to the Helping Hand: Government Ownership 
 
In contrast to private ownership, government ownership may help the government agency restrain itself 
from excessive rent-seeking.  The government agency may become less predatory towards the investment it owns 
and, as a result, government ownership will encourage the manager to initiate the investment.  The analysis proceeds 
in three stages, namely, the ex post stage, the interim stage, and the ex ante stage.  In the ex post stage, the 
government agency takes the hiring decision and the manager chooses effort to implement the investment.  In the 
interim stage, the government agency collects the fee.  In the ex ante stage, the manager chooses effort to initiate the 
investment.  
 
3.1 The Ex Post Stage 
   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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After the fee is paid and the slot is allocated, the government agency decides on x, the number of excess 
workers to hire, simultaneously with the manager’s choice of effort a to implement the investment.
10  Anticipating 
managerial effort a*, the government agency chooses x to maximize its payoff: 
 
λGf(a*, x) + U(x, θ), 
 
where θ ∈ {θh, θl}.  Let x(a*, θ) be the reaction function of the government agency.   
 
Lemma 1: 
  The reaction function of the government agency x(a*, θ) is strictly decreasing in anticipated managerial 
effort a* and, for any anticipated managerial effort a*, x(a*, θh) < x(a*, θl).  
 
  The intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows.  Given that ∂
2f(a, x)/(∂a∂x) < 0, the marginal cost of hiring 
excess workers increases as the managerial effort a increases (notice that ∂f(a, x)/∂x < 0).  Therefore, x(a*, θ) 
decreases in anticipated managerial effort a*.  The pro-business government agency hires fewer excess workers than 
the pro-politics government agency because the marginal benefit of hiring excess workers is lower when the 
government agency is pro-business, i.e., ∂U(x, θh)/∂x < ∂U(x, θl)/∂x.    
  On the other hand, the manager chooses effort anticipating the government agency’s hiring decision.  Since 
the government agency’s decision depends on its type, the manager anticipates the choice of x to be at one of two 
levels, xh and xl.  These two anticipated levels of hiring of excess workers, however, need to be consistent in the 
sense that they are responding to the same level of managerial effort.  Hence, if a
-1(x , θ) is the inverse function of 
x(a, θ), we assume that xh and x satisfies the following condition:    
 
a
-1(xh , θh) = a
-1(xl, θl).  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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With this assumption, we redefine the manager’s anticipation so that, instead of anticipating xh and xl, the 
manager anticipates what the government agency anticipates about his own effort.  Let a** denote such anticipation 
so that xh ≡ x(a**, θh) and xl ≡ x(a**, θl).  The manager chooses a to maximize his payoff: 
 
(1 - λG)[ρf(a, x(a**, θh)) + (1 - ρ)f(a, x(a**, θl))] – a. 
 
Let a(a**, ρ) be the reaction function of the manager.   
When he believes that the government agency is anticipating a greater effort from him, the manager expects 
fewer excess workers to be hired (Lemma 1).  As a result, the manager expects a higher marginal productivity of his 
effort and, therefore, he is willing to put forth more effort.  Similarly, when he believes that the government agency 
is more likely to be pro-business, i.e., ρ is higher, and therefore will hire fewer excess workers (Lemma 1), the 
manager will increase his effort.  The next lemma summarizes these two observations.  
 
Lemma 2: 
  The reaction function of the manager a(a**, ρ) is strictly increasing in a** and ρ.    
  
Given the manager’s posterior belief ρ, the equilibrium choices of a and x(θ) are determined when 
anticipated managerial effort equals actual managerial effort and the anticipated hiring of excess workers equals the 
actual hiring of excess workers.  The equilibrium of the continuation game is defined by {a
G(ρ), x
G(ρ, θh), x
G(ρ, θl)} 
where:  
 
x
G(ρ, θh) = x(a
G(ρ), θh), x
G(ρ, θl) = x(a
G(ρ), θl), and 
a
G(ρ) = a(a**, ρ) such that a(a**, ρ) = a**. 
  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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Figure 2. The Choice of a and x in the Continuation Game under Government Ownership 
Determining the equilibrium {a
G(ρ), x
G(ρ, θh), x
G(ρ, θl)} requires finding a solution to the fixed point 
mapping a(a**, ρ) = a**.  Since a(a**, ρ) is increasing in a**, a condition is needed to ensure that the equilibrium is 
stable.  We assume that, for any ρ,: 
 
         ∂a(a**, ρ)/∂a** < 1, ∀ρ.
      (1)
11 
 
Since f(a, x) satisfies the Inada condition, a(0, ρ) > 0 for any ρ.  Accordingly, condition (1) implies the existence of 
a unique stable solution to the fixed-point mapping a(a**, ρ) = a**, as shown in Figure 2.  In Figure 2, given 
managerial effort a
G(ρ), the pro-business government agency chooses x
G(θh, ρ) and the pro-politics government 
agency chooses x
G(θl, ρ).  Anticipating these choices of the government agency, the manager puts forth effort a
G(ρ).  
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that condition (1) always holds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Proposition 2: 
  Given the manager’s posterior belief ρ, there exists a unique equilibrium for the continuation game in 
which:  
(1)  the pro-business government agency hires fewer excess workers than the pro-politics government agency so that 
x
G(ρ, θh) < x
G(ρ, θl);  
a, x 
a
G(ρ) 
x(a, θl) 
x(a, θh) 
x
G(θl, ρ) 
a
G(ρ) 
x
G(θh, ρ) 
a** 
a(a**, ρ) 
45
o William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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(2)  managerial effort a
G(ρ) increases in the manager’s posterior belief ρ; and  
(3)  the government agency, regardless of its type, hires fewer excess workers as the manager’s posterior belief ρ 
increases.    
 
The first part of Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 1.  This observation, together with Lemma 2 
demonstrates the second part of Proposition 2.  Because the government agency hires fewer excess workers when it 
is pro-business, managerial effort increases if the manager believes that the government agency is more likely to be 
pro-business.  The third part of Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 1 and the second part of this proposition.   
   Proposition 2 has two important implications.  First, to solicit more effort from the manager, the 
government agency may try to influence the manager’s posterior belief and convince him that it will not hire many 
excess workers.  Second, because the pro-business government agency hires fewer excess workers, the marginal 
productivity of managerial effort is higher when the government agency is pro-business.  The next lemma formalizes 
this last observation.    
 
Lemma 3: 
  The marginal value of ex post managerial effort is larger for the pro-business government agency than it is 
for the pro-politics government agency. 
 
Because the marginal value of managerial effort is greater for the pro-business government agency, the pro-
business government agency may be able to charge a smaller fee than the pro-politics government agency is willing 
to charge.  Therefore, the pro-business government agency can convince the manager that it is pro-business.  We 
now turn to an analysis of the stage in which the government agency charges the fee for the slot.     
  
3.2 The Interim Stage 
 
At this stage, the manager forms a posterior belief regarding the government agency’s type, based on how it 
sets the fee.  Without loss of generality, we focus on the pure strategy adopted by the government agency, which is 
defined as the fee charged given the state of nature θ, only.  A pure-strategy sequential equilibrium can be either William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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separating or pooling.  In a separating equilibrium, the pro-business government agency and the pro-politics 
government agency charge a different amount for the fee.  Let Bh denote the fee charged by the pro-business 
government agency and Bl that charged by the pro-politics government agency with Bh ≠ Bl.  In such an equilibrium, 
the manager has posterior belief such that ρ(B = Bh) = 1 and ρ(B = Bl) = 0.  In a pooling equilibrium, the pro-
business government agency and the pro-politics government agency charge the same fee, denoted by Bhl.  Then, the 
manager’s posterior belief will be ρ(B = Bhl) = p.  We show that there exists a unique equilibrium, which is 
separating.     
Define v
G(ρ = 0) and v
G(ρ = 1) as the payoffs received by the manager in a separating equilibrium after he 
pays the fee charged by the pro-politics and pro-business government agencies, respectively.  These payoffs 
determine the maximum fees that these government agencies can extract in a separating equilibrium.  Fewer 
excessive workers are hired and greater managerial effort is exerted if the government agency is pro-business.  
Therefore, in a separating equilibrium, the maximal fee extractable by the government agency is higher when the 
government agency is pro-business.  Hence, we have Lemma 4. 
 
Lemma 4: 
  Under government ownership, the maximum fee that the government agency can extract in a separating 
equilibrium is higher when the government agency is pro-business, i.e., v
G(ρ = 1) > v
G(ρ = 0).   
  
Proposition 3: 
Under government ownership, there exists a unique equilibrium, which has the following properties:  
(1)  the fee charged by the pro-business government agency is strictly less than that charged by the pro-politics 
government agency, i.e., Bh < Bl; and 
(2)  the pro-politics government agency extracts all the rents from the manager, i.e., Bl = v
G(ρ = 0); whereas the pro-
business government agency does not, i.e., Bh < v
G(ρ = 1). 
 
The intuition for these results is as follows.  In order to separate itself from the pro-politics government 
agency, the pro-business government agency must charge a smaller fee.  Otherwise, the pro-politics government 
agency could charge the same fee and, at the same time, receive more managerial effort from the deceived manager.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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Since the pro-business government agency charges a smaller fee, the pro-politics government agency faces a trade-
off.  It can either receive more managerial effort by charging the same fee or it can receive less managerial effort by 
charging a larger fee in equilibrium.  Since the marginal value of the managerial effort is lower for the pro-politics 
government agency, the pro-politics government agency will opt for the second choice if the fee charged by the pro-
business government agency is sufficiently small.    
As it trades off managerial effort for a larger amount of fee, the pro-politics government agency exploits 
fully its bargaining power and extracts all the rents from the manager.  Thus, Bl = v
G(ρ = 0).  Furthermore, since 
v
G(ρ = 1) > v
G(ρ = 0) from Lemma 4, it follows that Bh < v
G(ρ = 1).  In other words, the manager is able to retain 
some of the rents from the investment when the government agency is pro-business.  
 
3.3 The Ex Ante Stage 
 
Proposition 3 presents the central result that government ownership can serve as a credible commitment 
mechanism through which the government agency may restrain itself from exercising fully its bargaining power.  
Therefore, government ownership may help alleviate the hold-up problem.  Indeed, the ex ante payoff for the 
manager, denoted by V
G, will be V
G = p(v
G(ρ = 1) – Bh) > 0.  Ex ante, the manager chooses e to maximize [µ(e)V
G – 
e]. 
 
Corollary 1:   
(1)  The manager has a positive incentive to initiate the investment under government ownership; and  
(2)  government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership.  
 
  The analysis presented above offers a new insight into why local government-owned firms, instead of 
private firms, have become the driving force behind China’s rapid economic growth.  During the early period of 
China’s transition to market, input markets were not liberalized.  Inputs, especially those crucial to business 
activities, were under stringent government control.  Such an environment, plus the lack of institutional mechanisms 
to hold governments accountable, provided fertile ground for government rent-seeking and private incentives 
suffered.  Local government ownership, represented by China’s TVEs, helped these governments restrain William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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themselves from taking full advantage of their bargaining power and thus protected private incentives that were 
pivotal to economic performance.  When other conditions were suitable, i.e., the presence of low cost labor and 
market opportunities, local government ownership allowed the non-state sector to grow rapidly in China.    
  The analysis also unravels a paradox regarding local government-owned enterprises in China.  Although 
these enterprises have contributed significantly to China’s remarkable economic growth, empirical studies find that 
local governments use their enterprises to pursue their own political agenda, making these enterprises arguably less 
productive than their private counterparts.  This analysis recognizes the possible inefficiency of government 
ownership compared with private ownership, conditional on investments being initiated under both ownership 
forms.  However, exactly such supposed inefficiency, i.e., government intervention in investment and agency cost in 
soliciting managerial incentives, that has made the initiation of investments more likely under government 
ownership.   
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that a rent-seeking government agency may turn its grabbing hand 
toward private firms into a helping hand toward government-owned firms.  To see this point, notice that Bh is set so 
that the incentive compatibility constraint for the pro-politics government agency is binding.  That is: 
 
λGf(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl), θl) + Bl = 
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl), θl) + Bh. 
 
Since Bl = (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) – a(ρ = 0), we have: 
 
Bh = f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl), θl) – a(ρ = 0)  
– [λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl), θl)].  
 
In other words, Bh ≥ 0 if and only if: 
 
f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl), θl) – a(ρ = 0)  
     ≥ λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl), θl).    (2) 
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Corollary 2:  
Under government ownership, the pro-business government agency will charge a fee to the firm if (2) 
holds, but will offer a subsidy otherwise.  
 
Since the government agency is delegated by a higher-level government to regulate the allocation of the 
slot, the subsidy may also be interpreted as the government agency hiding fiscal revenues from the higher-level 
government.  This interpretation sheds light on a phenomenon, which has sometimes been observed in China, that 
local governments offer tax rebates and concessions to the local government-owned enterprises without approval 
from the central government (Berkowitz and Li, 2000).  The central government opposed such a practice, known as 
hiding fortune at your constituents or cang fu yu min, because it could lead to a loss of the central government’s 
fiscal revenues.  This practice is in sharp contrast to local governments collecting arbitrary fees and taxes from 
private enterprises.  Nevertheless, by neglecting the responsibility of collecting revenues on behalf of the central 
government, the local governments can actually motivate managers to take more effort and, thus, increase revenues 
that accrue to the local governments directly. 
The next proposition, which follows directly from the discussion above, summarizes the results in this 
section.   
 
 
Proposition 4: 
Suppose that B ∈ (-∞, ∞).  Under government ownership, there exists a unique equilibrium in which: 
(1)  the pro-business government agency collects a smaller fee than the pro-politics government agency  if condition 
(2) holds; 
(2)  the pro-business government agency offers a subsidy while the pro-politics government agency collects a fee if 
condition (2) does not hold;  
(3)  the manager has a positive incentive to initiate the investment; and 
(4)  government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership.     
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  The analysis in the previous section characterizes a situation in which government ownership Pareto 
dominates private ownership.  However, two rather restrictive assumptions are applied.  First, investment cannot 
take place, and therefore will yield no return, if the manager is denied the slot.  Second, the government agency can 
offer an unbounded subsidy if necessary.  In this section, we relax these two assumptions.  First, if the manager is 
denied the slot, we assume that investment can still take place but that it will yield a smaller return, which, for 
simplicity, is assumed to be a fixed amount and is denoted by r.  Second, the government agency faces a fiscal 
budget constraint B such that B ∈ [- B, ∞).  These two alternative assumptions afford a more balanced comparison 
between private ownership and government ownership.  
  The qualitative analysis concerning private ownership remains the same, except that the ex ante payoff that 
the manager receives, denoted by V
P, is:  
 
V
P = r, 
 
because the government agency is able to charge a fee of B
p = [f(a
p, 0) – a
p – r] only.  Provided that Bh ≥ - B, the 
qualitative analysis concerning government ownership remains unchanged.   
Suppose that Bh ≥ - B; under government ownership, the pro-politics government agency will charge Bl 
such that Bl = [v
G(ρ = 0) – (1 - λG)r], where v
G(ρ = 0) is the payoff that the manager receives after he pays Bl.  The 
pro-business government agency will choose a fee or subsidy Bh such that: 
 
Bh = f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl), θl) – a(ρ = 0) - (1 - λG)r 
– [λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl), θl)]. 
 
The separating equilibrium exists if Bh ≥ - B, or if:   
 
f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl), θl) – a(ρ = 0)  
– [λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl), θl)] ≥ - B + (1 - λG)r.    (2)’ 
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In such an equilibrium, the ex ante payoff to the manager is:  
 
V
G = p{(1 - λG)f(a(ρ = 1), x(ρ = 1, θh)) – a(ρ = 1) – Bh} + (1 – p)(1 - λG)r. 
 
Lemma 5: 
  ∂V
P/∂r > ∂V
G/∂r > 0.   
 
The amount of return generated by the investment without the slot reflects the critical nature of the slot to 
the investment project.  According to Lemma 5, the less critical is the slot, i.e., the larger is r, the larger is the ex 
ante payoff that the manager receives from the investment.  Furthermore, the manager’s ex ante payoff increases 
faster in r under private ownership than under government ownership.  Under private ownership, the manager is the 
only one to have a claim over r; whereas, under government ownership, r is shared between the government agency 
and the manager.  Since the manager’s ex ante payoff is larger under government ownership than under private 
ownership when r = 0, Lemma 5 implies that there exists a threshold of r beyond which private ownership, instead 
of government ownership, promotes better ex ante managerial incentives.   
Suppose Bh < - B instead.  In this case, a separating equilibrium under government ownership will no 
longer exist.  Rather, a continuum of pooling equilibria will emerge.  In all these equilibria, the government 
agency’s type is not revealed.  Accordingly, the government agency will have no incentive to restrain itself from 
rent-seeking activities, regardless of whether it is pro-business or pro-politics.  Hence, we will focus on the pooling 
equilibrium in which both types of the government agency set the fee to extract as much rent as possible from the 
manager.  Therefore, we have: 
 
Bhl = (1 - λG)[pf(a
G(ρ = p), x
G(ρ = p, θh)) + (1 – p)f(a
G(ρ = p), x
G(ρ = p, θl))] – a
G(ρ = p) - (1 - λG)r. 
 
The ex ante payoff to the manager in such an equilibrium is:  
 
V
G = (1 - λG)r. 
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Obviously, V
G < V
P; in other words, private ownership rather than government ownership promotes better ex ante 
managerial incentives.  
Whether government ownership or private ownership should be adopted depends on the trade-off between 
ex ante managerial incentives and ex post efficiency.  Given the assumption that the political benefits received by 
the government agency from hiring excess workers do not have any social value, the social surplus under private 
ownership is: 
 
SS
P= µ(e
P)[f(a
P, x
P = 0) – a
P] – e
P; 
 
and the social surplus under government ownership is: 
 
SS
G= µ(e
G){p[f(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θh) – a
G(ρ = 1)] + (1 – p)[f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl) – a
G(ρ = 0)] – e
G. 
 
Since private ownership is always ex post efficient, government ownership may be more efficient than private 
ownership only if it improves ex ante managerial incentives.  Therefore, we conclude with Proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5: 
  Government ownership is more efficient than private ownership only if:  
(1)  the slot is critical to the investment, i.e., r is sufficiently small;   
(2)  the government agency has a sufficiently large fiscal budget when condition (2) does not hold; and 
(3)  the government agency is likely to be pro-business, i.e., p is sufficiently close and yet not equal to 1.   
 
We add a final note to highlight the importance of the information asymmetry between the manager and the 
government agency in determining the possible dominance of government ownership.    
 
Corollary 3:  
  Private ownership weakly dominates government ownership if p = 1 or p = 0.      
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5. Conclusion: Interpreting China’s Township-Village Enterprises 
 
We began this paper with the observation that private enterprises in China have often suffered from the 
encroachment of local governments whereas firms with local government ownership have flourished under the 
support of local governments.  Then we show how certain ownership arrangements, especially government 
ownership, can serve as a commitment mechanism through which government agencies will restrain themselves 
from rent-seeking activities.  Such commitment is shown to have the potential of promoting private incentives and 
ultimately benefiting government agencies themselves.  In this conclusion, we use the analysis to shed light on the 
relative success of local government-owned enterprises in China and discuss their future.  
Our analysis is consistent with several stylized observations of China’s TVEs.  Conventional wisdom 
considers the rise of local government-owned enterprises in China to be related closely to the underdevelopment of 
input markets and that local governments have contributed critical inputs to the growth of these enterprises (Chang 
and Wang, 1994; Naughton, 1994 and 1996; Putterman, 1997; Chen and Rozelle, 1999; and Tian, 2000).  For 
example, Naughton (1994) suggests that the control of critical inputs, e.g., land, by local governments is an 
important factor explaining the emergence of China’s TVEs.  Our analysis formalizes this argument by showing that 
government ownership dominates private ownership only when the inputs that the government agency controls are 
critical.     
More importantly, our analysis explains why the critical inputs must be acquired within the boundary of the 
firm instead of through market transactions.  The critical-input argument itself cannot rationalize an ownership 
arrangement.  According to the property rights literature, ownership rights enhance the bargaining power of the 
party to whom the rights are allocated (Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990).  For an environment 
in which incentives of private parties are important and local governments are often counter-productive, ownership 
rights should be allocated to private parties, e.g., managers or entrepreneurs, and the acquisition of critical inputs 
should take place through market transactions as Corollary 3 demonstrates.  This analysis adds a twist to the existing 
property rights literature by capturing two salient features in the government-management relation for China’s 
TVEs.
12  First, by having control of the firm, the local government is likely to interfere with the management and 
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absolutely certain whether and how the local government will interfere with the management.  As this analysis 
shows, these two features help account for the nature of government ownership of TVEs.  In particular, when 
allocating inputs to a firm, the local government may become lenient if it owns the firm, but will behave 
aggressively otherwise.  When the inputs are critical, government ownership emerges as a dominant ownership form 
because leniency is especially valuable in this situation.  Without leniency, the local government is able to 
appropriate large rents from the firm. 
The government-controlled input in our analysis should be interpreted more broadly than merely a physical 
input and might represent the political favor and support provided by local governments.  In the early stage of 
China’s economic transition, the political environment was hostile not only towards private enterprises, but also 
towards TVEs.  As they penetrated the traditional turf of state-owned enterprises, TVEs were considered a threat to 
the state sector.  Despite this, TVEs were able to thrive thanks to the political favor and support granted by the local 
governments (Nee, 1992 and Li, 1996).  Some of these enterprises were created by entrepreneurs as private firms 
and later registered as TVEs.  Other TVEs were first established by local governments, but later employed private 
entrepreneurs in management.  In either case, both private entrepreneurs and local governments found it in their 
interests to team up together.  
The rapid development of China’s TVEs did not take place until the early 1980’s when fiscal 
decentralization was introduced.  Fiscal decentralization devolved fiscal authorities from the central government to 
local governments and allowed the latter to maintain a large share of the fiscal revenues generated from the local 
economy.  Hence, it created incentives for local governments to promote local economies (Oi, 1992 and 1999; 
Wong, 1992; Qian and Weingast, 1996; and Berkowitz and Li, 2000).  As our analysis suggests, the dominance of 
local government ownership requires the local government to be able to retain the fiscal revenues generated from the 
firm and not hand them over to higher-level governments.  However, why did TVEs instead of private enterprises 
benefit particularly from fiscal decentralization?  By alluding to corruption, our analysis suggests that fiscal 
incentives will not stop local governments from behaving in a predatory manner toward private firms.  Indeed, the 
government agency will try to extract as much rent as possible from a private firm even when the firm generates tax 
revenues.  In contrast, fiscal incentives will induce the government agency to restrain itself from rent-seeking 
activities when it owns the firm.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
 
  21
An important implication of our analysis is that the ownership form of China’s TVEs will evolve in 
response to the dynamics of the institutional environment.  At least two institutional changes will have significant 
impacts on the ownership arrangement.  The first is the liberalization in ideology and the emergence of a political 
climate under which the development of the non-state sector, and private firms in particular, will be regarded as 
legitimate and an integral part of China’s economic transition.  Such a change in ideology and government policies 
towards private firms may induce a transformation of TVEs from government ownership to private ownership.  The 
second is the development of input markets.  As input markets are liberalized, an increasing number of inputs will be 
allocated through market mechanisms, free of bureaucratic discretion.  The development of the input markets will 
decrease the local government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis private enterprises as government-regulated inputs 
become increasingly less relevant.  It will also give rise to increased mobility for local enterprises and induce 
competition among local governments, which will reduce their bargaining power even further.  In a recent empirical 
study, Jin and Qian (1998) show that the role of local government owned-enterprises has become less prominent in 
areas with better-developed product markets (see also, Chen and Rozelle, 1999 and Tian, 2000).      
  The development of China’s TVEs was not uniform across regions even during the early stage of economic 
reform.  Our analysis suggests that TVEs are likely to emerge when the local government is more likely to be pro-
business and has a well-endowed fiscal budget.  For example, in their study of China’s local government-owned 
enterprises, Byrd and Gelb (1990) find that, in relatively prosperous areas, the relationship between community 
governments and their enterprises tends to be mutually beneficial but, in poorer areas, governments are forced to 
exploit their enterprises, to the long-term detriment of both firms and community.   
In contrast to local government-owned enterprises, which have been the driving force of China’s recent 
economic development, many state-owned enterprises have had deteriorating financial performances in recent years 
despite on-going enterprise reforms.  In 1994, more than 40 percent of the state-owned enterprises incurred losses, 
which amounted to 6.1 percent of total industrial value added and one percent of China’s GDP.  There are many 
factors attributable to the lack-luster performance of state-owned enterprises.  It is not the purpose of this paper to 
examine these factors.  However, we draw an important implication from our analysis.  Like local government-
owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises from time to time rely on government agencies at the local level to 
provide inputs under regulation.  However, unlike local government-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises 
hand over a large share of their returns to the central government, which either controls directly these enterprises or William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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delegates the control to local governments.  Because government agencies at the local level do not receive a 
significant share of revenues from state-owned enterprises, they have less incentive to help these enterprises 
overcome bureaucratic barriers in acquiring government-controlled inputs.  For the same reason, when these local 
government agencies exercise control over state-owned enterprises on behalf of the usually pro-politics central 
government, they will be pro-politics as well, which adds to the troubles of the embattled state-owned enterprises.       
  The current study is a partial equilibrium analysis.  By considering the interaction between institutional 
dynamics, e.g., the liberalized input markets, and the evolution of ownership forms, the relationship between the 
development of local government ownership and the dual track reform in China, where resources are allocated both 
through plans and on the emerging markets, could be analyzed.  Another interesting extension would be to study 
how the organization of government institution affects the ownership of a firm.  The organization of government 
institution can be characterized as the allocation of many different slots among various government agencies.  Such 
a study would help us to understand why the relative success of local government ownership remains a phenomenon 
peculiar to China, but is not observed in Russia and other transition countries.   
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Denote the payoff of the government agency at this stage as:  
w(θ; a(ρ)) = λGf(a
G(ρ), x
G(ρ, θ)) + U(x
G(ρ, θ), θ), 
where θ ∈ {θh, θl}.  Differentiate w(θ; a(ρ)) with respect to ρ.  Using the envelope theorem, we obtain: 
∂w(θ; a(ρ))/∂ρ = λG[∂f(a
G(ρ), x
G(ρ, θ))/∂a](∂a/∂ρ).   
Since x
G(ρ, θh) < x
G(ρ, θl) according to Proposition 2, and since ∂
2f/(∂a∂x) < 0, 
∂f(a
G(ρ), x
G(ρ, θh))/∂a > ∂f(a
G(ρ), x
G(ρ, θl))/∂a. 
In other words, 
∂w(θh; a(ρ))/∂ρ > ∂w(θl; a(ρ))/∂ρ.     Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
By definition,   
v
G(ρ = 0) = (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) – a(ρ = 0), and 
v
G(ρ = 1) = (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θh)) – a(ρ = 1). 
Since x
G(ρ = 1, θh) < x
G(ρ = 0, θh), according to the third part of Proposition 2, and x
G(ρ = 0, θh) < x
G(ρ = 0, θl), 
according to the first part of Proposition 2, the result is obtained using the envelope theorem.    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
Let W(B, a; θ) denote the government agency’s payoff at this stage: 
W(B, a; θ) = λGf(a, x) + U(x, θ) + B, 
where θ ∈ {θh, θl}.  According to Lemma 3, W(B, a; θ) has a single crossing property.  Hence, for any (B, a),  
Wa/WB(θ = θh) > Wa/WB(θ = θl), 
where Wa = ∂W/∂a and WB = ∂W/∂B.  Therefore, we can draw indifference curves for the high-type agency, i.e., the 
pro-business agency, and the low-type agency, i.e., the pro-politics agency, in the {B, a} space as shown in Figure 3.   
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Figure 2. The Choice of a and x in the Continuation Game under Government Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3, notice that the indifference curves for the pro-business government agency are everywhere 
steeper than the indifference curves for the pro-politics government agency because of the single-crossing property.  
With this in mind, we proceed to prove the proposition.  
First, there exists no pooling equilibrium that survives the intuitive-criterion test because, given the single-
crossing property, there exists a B for any pooling equilibrium Bhl such that B ≠ Bhl and: 
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θh)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θh); θh) + B >  
λGf(a
G(ρ = p), x
G(ρ = p, θh)) + U(x
G(ρ = p, θh); θh) + Bhl, 
while at the same time: 
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl); θh) + B <  
λGf(a
G(ρ = p), x
G(ρ = p, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = p, θl); θl) + Bhl. 
In other words, for any pooling equilibrium Bhl, there exists a different fee that the pro-business agency only will 
find profitable and thus charge under certain posterior beliefs of the manger.   
Second, the government agency, regardless of its type, can do no worse than charge a fee leading the 
manager to form the worst belief of its type.  In particular, the pro-business government agency’s payoff is bounded 
below by: 
W(B = v
G(ρ = 0), a
G(ρ = 0); θh) = λGf(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θh)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θh); θh)  
+ (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) – a
G(ρ = 0), 
and the pro-politics government agency’s payoff is bounded below by: 
a 
B 
maxBh 
maxBl 
a(ρ = 1)  a(ρ = 0)  a(ρ = p)
{B,a |W(B, a; θh) = W} 
{B,a |W(B, a; θl) = W}William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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W(B = v
G(ρ = 0), a
G(ρ = 0); θl) = f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl); θl) – a
G(ρ = 0).  
In a separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive-criterion test, the pro-politics agency must charge the 
fee:   
Bl = (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) – a
G(ρ = 0); 
and Bh must be such that the pro-politics government agency does no worse than W(B = v
G(ρ = 0), a
G(ρ = 0); θh).  
Hence, we obtain: 
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θh)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θh); θh) + Bh  ≥  
λGf(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θh)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θh); θh)  
+ (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) – a
G(ρ = 0).      (*)  
Such a separating equilibrium exists if Bl and Bh also satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions, that is, 
the pro-business government agency will not find preferable Bl preferable, which is condition (*) and the pro-
politics government agency will not find Bh preferable, which requires:  
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl); θl) + Bh ≤ 
     f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl); θl) – a
G(ρ  =  0).    (**)   
  Obviously, for a sequential equilibrium that survives the intuitive-criterion test, one of these two conditions 
must be binding.  When condition (**) is binding, condition (*) is reduced to: 
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θh)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θh); θh) - λGf(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θh)) - U(x
G(ρ = 0, θh); θh) ≥  
λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl); θl) - λGf(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) - U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl); θl), 
which holds according to Lemma 3.   
Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium, which is separating; in this equilibrium, the pro-politics 
government agency will charge Bl = (1 - λG)f(a
G(ρ = 0)) – a
G(ρ = 0) and the pro-business government agency will 
charge Bh ≥ 0 so that condition (**) holds with equality.            Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
  Under private ownership, ∂V
P/∂r = 1. Under government ownership, ∂V
G/∂r = - p∂Bh/∂r + (1 – p)(1 - λG).   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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To evaluate ∂Bh/∂r, notice that, in a separating equilibrium that survives the intuitive-criterion test, the pro-
politics government agency collects a fee Bl = [v
G(ρ = 0) – r] and the pro-business government agency chooses a fee 
Bh that the pro-politics government agency does not find preferable.   
Hence, the pro-politics government agency has payoff: 
λGf(a(ρ = 0), x(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x(ρ = 0, θl), θl) + v
G(ρ = 0) – (1 - λG)r. 
For Bh ≥ - B, the pro-business government agency must choose Bh to statisfy: 
λGf(a(ρ = 0), x(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x(ρ = 0, θl), θl) + v
G(ρ = 0) – (1 - λG)r =  
λGf(a(ρ = 1), x(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x(ρ = 1, θl), θl) + Bh,   
in which case ∂Bh/∂r = - (1 - λG).  This holds when Bh satisfies the condition Bh ≥ - B, which now is  
 
f(a
G(ρ = 0), x
G(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 0, θl), θl) – a(ρ = 0)  
– [λGf(a
G(ρ = 1), x
G(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x
G(ρ = 1, θl), θl)] ≥ - B + (1 - λG)r     (2)’ 
When condition (2)’ does not hold, the pro-business government agency will pay a subsidy Bh < 0 such that 
the pro-politics government agency does not want to follow its behavior.  Hence, we obtain: 
λGf(a(ρ = 0), x(ρ = 0, θl)) + U(x(ρ = 0, θl), θl) + v
G(ρ = 0) – (1 - λG)r =  
λGf(a(ρ = 1), x(ρ = 1, θl)) + U(x(ρ = 1, θl), θl) + (1 - λG)Bh, 
in which case, ∂Bh/∂r = - 1. 
In either case, ∂V
G/∂r ∈ (0, 1).  Hence, ∂V
P/∂r > ∂V
G/∂r   >   0 .       Q . E . D .  
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End Notes 
                                                           
1 This paper is based upon an earlier paper entitled “From the Grabbing Hand to the Helping Hand” (Che, 1997).  I 
thank Michael Alexeev, Daniel Berkowitz, Hongbin Cai, Uday Rajan, Thomas Rawski, Li-An Zhou, two 
anonymous referees, seminar participants at 1997 annual international conference on transition economics, Carnegie 
Mellon University, Harvard Business School, INSEAD, UCLA, UC Riverside, UC Santa Barbara, University of 
Pittsburgh, and especially Laixiang Sun and John Bonin for helpful comments.  I am also grateful to the Euro-Asia 
Center, INSEAD for offering me a wonderful facility to complete the revision of this paper.  All errors remain mine. 
2 Indeed, local government agencies collecting illicit fees, charges, and tolls has been one of the major concerns 
during the recent efforts in reforming government organizations and the tax system in China. 
3 For example, Byrd (1990) suggests that the presence of local governments in the ownership of TVEs has been 
pivotal in securing loans from government-controlled banks (see also, Zhang and Ronnas, 1996).  Nee (1992) 
maintains that TVEs have benefited from the political connections of local governments in expanding their market 
reach.  Others like Chang and Wang (1994), Naughton (1994, 1996), and Putterman (1997) argue that local 
governments had contributed critical inputs, such as land, initial collective assets, and human capital to the 
development of these enterprises.  Local governments are also said to provide political protection for TVEs (Che 
and Qian, 1998b and Li, 1996).  
4 The fee may be collected by a government agency to cover its local fiscal expenditures.  Indeed, many local 
government agencies in China have an extra budget that is not monitored closely by higher-level governments (Qian 
and Weingast, 1996) and is disposable for local fiscal expenditures.  The fee may also be collected by a government 
official to put into his own pocket; in which case, this fee is better described as a bribe. 
5 The expectation is conditional on the investment having taken place.   
6 Alternatively, we can model the control decision as some productive activity, but this will only strengthen the 
paper’s argument that government ownership may dominate private ownership. 
7 This assumption can be justified easily.  For example, imagine a scenario where over-staffing requires more 
managerial effort for monitoring to prevent theft or embezzlement and, thus, leads to lower marginal productivity 
under diminishing marginal productivity.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 497 
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8 The manager’s posterior belief becomes irrelevant if the agency does not allocate the slot; in which case, the 
project will be terminated.   
9 The manager shares the investment return perhaps because he is the only one who has the technological expertise 
necessary for the investment.  One may endogenize these shares, using the framework of Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990). 
10 The qualitative results of this paper hold as long as the government agency chooses x  no earlier than the manager 
decides on a.  Such sequence rules out the possibility that the government agency uses the choice of x to signal its 
type.  Even if the government agency does choose x prior to the manager exerting his effort, the qualitative results of 
this analysis may still hold if the manager can observe x only with some noise.   
11 This condition holds if λGfxa
2 > λGfxxfaa + Uxxfaa holds for both θh and θl, where faa is the second derivative of f(.,.) 
with respect to a, fxx is the second derivative of f(.,.) with respect to x, fxa is the cross derivative of f(.,.) with respect 
to x and a, and Uxx is the second derivative of U(.,.) with respect to x.     
12 Similar to this paper, Chiu (1998) also shows that a party’s investment incentive may increase when ownership of 
an asset is allocated away from him.  The mechanism, however, is completely different from the one in this paper.  
In Chiu (1998), parties’ outside options place constraints on the ex post bargaining outcome.      
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